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Operation ''Canada''
5th Canadian Ar111oured
Division's Attack on Delfzijl,
23 April to 2 May 1945
Daniel Byers
peration "Canada" was the last action fought
by 5th Canadian Armoured Division in the
Second World War. The battle to open the
northern Dutch port of Delfzijllasted ten days,
and cost the Division a total of 62 dead and 180
wounded. Yet it has largely been forgotten. 1 The
capture of Delfzijl is interesting enough to be
worth studying in its own right. As one of the
last Canadian actions in the war, it reveals the
level of proficiency achieved by Canadian soldiers
by that time. The reduction of the pocket was
carried out with a high degree of efficiency, and
saw excellent cooperation between all combat
arms. It is also a useful reminder that for many
Canadians the costly fighting did not end in
North-West Europe until the very last days of the
war.

O

The battle for Delfzijl also raises two
questions: why was it undertaken so close to
the end of the war. and why did commanders
continue to advance in the face of strong
opposition that was detected early in the
operation? The aim of this article is to address
these questions, as well as describing the battle
itself in some detail. As it argues. the reduction
of the pocket was authorized due to a
combination of strategic and operational factors.
It was continued after the strength of the defences
became evident because once the troops were in
range of the pocket's defences it was less costly
to press ahead and finish the task, at least in
the eyes of Canadian commanders, than to
conduct a longer holding operation or siege.

*****

elfzijl is located on the coast of the Ems
Estuary, facing the German port of Emden.
As one of Holland's largest secondary ports, it
looked promising to military planners for use in
relieving the starving Dutch population following
the "hunger winter" of 1944-1945. 2 At first glance
it seemed easier to capture than ports in the west
of the country, where German occupiers had
retreated behind prepared defences against the
advancing Canadians. In addition, heavy guns
at Delfzijl protected the approaches to Emden,
a potential base for last-ditch operations by£boats, midget submarines, and other naval
weapons should Germany continue to resist
defeat, as it had so far. 3 Emden was a strategic
target for Allied planners, and more importantly
for 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, which was
then advancing towards it. 5th Division's
operations were designed to support that
advance by putting constant pressure on Delfzijl.
to prevent the defenders from retreating to
reinforce Emden.~ Thus, the attack on Delfzijl
was motivated at the strategic level by several
factors, which combined to make its capture an
important aim.

D

Unfortunately, the closing of the pocket was
complicated by orders designed to protect Dutch
inhabitants. Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister, 5th
Division's GOC (General Officer Commanding),
was asked to mount the operation using nothing
more powerful than his usual infantry support
weapons: tanks, 25-pounder artillery, and 3-inch
mortars. 5 Against these were ranged four troops
oflarge enemy guns from 256 Naval Anti-Aircraft
Battery, which were located near Delfzijl, and at
the "Reider Spit" to the south and east. All were
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A gathering qf generals at 5th
Canadian Armoured Division
Headquarters. 20 March 1945.
Left to right: Brigadier I.H.
Cumberland. commander. 5th
Canadian Armoured Brigade:
Major-General B.M.
Hoffmeister; GOC 5th
Canadian Armoured Division:
unknown: Field Marshal B.L.
Montgomery. commander: 21st
Army Group; unknown:
Lieutenant-General C. Foullces.
GOC I Canadian Corps:
Brigadier l.S. Johnston.
commander; 11 th Canadian
lrlfantry Brigade.

now turned inland to protect the pocket. Several
concentrations of smaller calibre artillery were
identified between Delfzijl and the town of
Farmsum, while heavy coastal guns were sighted
to fire into the area from as far away as Emden
and the North Sea island of Borkum. 6
Besides opposition guns, Intelligence Officers
identified at least 1500 German defenders
around Delfzijl, mostly naval fortress troops
converted to infantry, located in small battle
groups of 80-120 men at various strong points.
Experience would prove the total to be more than
4000, not including men killed or evacuated to
Emden during the battle. 7 Intelligence reports
compared the task of taking Delfzijl to that of
the "Breskens Pocket" in the Scheidt Estuary at
Antwerp, one of the Canadian Army's worst
battles of the previous autumn. 8 The terrain
around Delfzijl was similar to the Scheidt.
consisting of soft polderland crossed by
numerous drainage ditches and canals. All
vehicles were limited to the weak. narrow roads
of the region, and there was little cover anywhere.
Much of the area west ofDelfzijl had been flooded
by the Germans, and the pocket was ringed by a
prepared system of mines and trenches, linking
strong points centred on local villages. 9
A tactical problem faced Brigadier Ian S.
Johnston, the Commanding Officer of 11th

Canadian Infantry Brigade. and the immediate
commander of the operation. Considering the
number of enemy troops. the long frontage that
would have to be manned, and the artillery
superiority of his opponents, Johnston chose to
begin his attack on Delfzijl as soon as possible.
As he later put it.
There was little cover, the weather was miserable
and the enemy shelling was taking it's [sic] toll
of casualties. It was accordingly decided to push
forward to at least reduce the pocket immediately
with the reservation that as the picture developed
a pause could be made later when more troops
could be rested. ' 0

Tactical considerations, then, reinforced
strategic ones in the decision to proceed with
the reduction ofDelfzijl. Although 3rd Division's
matching advance on Emden actually went more
slowly than planned over the next few days,
Brigadier Johnston was forced by his local
situation to proceed with his own attack. He had
no way to know how close the war was to ending,
or the true number of men that his own soldiers
faced, and he planned his battle accordingly.
The two commanders of the operation,
Hoffmeister and Johnston, were well-qualified
to assess the dangers. Hoffmeister was one of
three prewar militia officers who rose to the rank
of Major-General during the war. after going

36
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss3/4

2

Byers: Operation “Canada”: 5th Canadian Armoured Division’s Attack on De

overseas as a company commander with the
Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver in 1939. He
took over as Commanding Officer of the unit in
October 1942, and by March 1944 rose to
command 5th Division. Hoffmeister led the
"Mighty Maroon Machine" through the rest of
their battles in Italy, before they moved to NorthWest Europe in early 1945. A recent study of
Canada's Second World War generals calls
Hoffmeister "the best Canadian fighting general
of the war. " 11 Brigadier Johnston was also a
veteran of many years in the prewar militia. He
mobilized in 1939 with the 48th Highlanders of
Toronto. going from Regimental Adjutant to
Commanding Officer by 1943. and taking
command of 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade in
June 1944. 12 Thus. both men were competent.
battle-hardened commanders. who knew their
jobs, while remembering what combat was like
for the average infantryman. Neither was likely
to attack Delfzijl unless convinced of the need,
and both did all they could to reduce the costs.
When asked to conduct operations without heavy
artillery. Hoffmeister reportedly consulted his
men down to the level of the other ranks
regarding their willingness to carry out the task. 13
To avoid enemy artillery. Hoffmeister and
Johnston directed that the operation be carried
out as much as possible as a night attack.
To fight the battle, Johnston had under
command four infantry battalions: the Cape
Breton Highlanders. the Perth Regiment, the Irish
Regiment. and the Westminster Regiment (5th
Division's motorized infantry). In support
Johnston could call on the guns of 8th Self-

Brigadier I. H. Cumberland. 5111
Canadian Armoured Brigade.
checlcing
a
map
wiih
Lieuienant.-Colonel
G.C.
Corbauli.
Westminster
Regiment and Lieut.enaniColonel Jack Eaton. 8th New
Brunswick Hussars.

Propelled and 17th Field Regiments, and two
out of three armoured regiments in the Division,
the British Columbia Dragoons and the 8th
Hussars. For the first two days, the fighting was
led by Brigadier I.H. Cumberland of 5th
Canadian Armoured Brigade, who ordered the
Westminsters and Irish to take over positions in
the villages of Siddeburen and Oostwolde to the
south of Delfzijl, while the Perths dug in to the
north. Johnston formally took command on the
morning of April 25, by which time all three
battalions were fully involved in combat.

*****
he battle for Delfzijl began at 11:00 p.m. on
the evening of April 23. Two platoons of the
Perth Regiment's "C" Company moved off from
Godlinze towards the east, capturing the villages
of Groote Nes and Klein Nes before pressing on
to their objectives on the coast. They arrived at
dawn, just as German artillery zeroed in on their
position. Meanwhile, "B" Company advanced
south-east towards Holwierde, but soon ran into
enemy opposition outside the village. Roadbound tanks ofthe British Columbia Dragoons'
Reconnaissance Troop. which were supporting
the Perths, were unable to reach them. Held up
by fire from self-propelled guns and other
artillery north-west of Nansum, the company
could only move forward again at 9:30 a.m.,
when supporting mortars fired smoke and high
explosives to cover them. The company finally
reached the edge of Holwierde at about 10:15.
Occupying a village was dangerous work, and

T
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Above: Soldiers of the Perlh Regiment
marching to the Jronl, April 1 945

Left: Privates V.R. Davis. D.C. Wragg
and J.M. Cunningham of lhe Perth
Regiment rest during the 5th Canadian
Armoured Division advance. April 1945

enemy artillery continued to inflict casualties
throughout the afternoon. Enemy patrols also
probed the lines during the afternoon and again
near midnight. 14
To the south, the Irish Regiment was relieving
3rd Division's Canadian Scottish Regiment in
Wagenborgen. Waiting to be relieved, the Scottish
had not pressed forward, and the rest of the town
had to be cleared by the Irish. with the aid of
two troops of tanks from the 8th Hussars. 15
Farther east, the Westminsters took over from
the Royal Winnipeg Rifles in Oostwolde,
accompanied by two more Hussars troops. At

6:00 p.m. on April 24. "A" and "C" companies
moved off along the road running north from
the village, "C" splitting off to advance along a
canal on the right. Despite sounds of enemy
movement and a few artillery rounds, they made
no direct contact with the enemy, and they
continued to move forward cautiously until l :00
p.m. the next day, reaching a point about two
miles south and east of Woldendorp. ](;
The British Columbia Dragoons received one
of their least pleasant orders on April 23. Crews
from two squadrons were told to "dismount" and
act as infantry in Appingedam, in the centre of
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the pocket. "A" and "B" Squadrons left their tanks
and formed four groups of one officer and fifteen
men each, plus a headquarters of twenty-one.
"C" Squadron also contributed crewmen from
two of its troops. 17 Part of the town was still in
German hands, and for the next ten days the
Dragoons conducted active patrols in the face of
heavy shelling. While one might question the use
of troopers as infantry, there were not enough
trained soldiers to man the entire perimeter of
the pocket. The Dragoons were assigned a fairly
simple holding role in the centre, in order to
free everyday infantrymen for more active roles
to the north and south. This is just one example
of the many expedients on which Canadian and
other national armies were forced to rely due to
chronic shortages of infantry throughout the
North-West European campaign.

+
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Once the various units had moved into
position around the Delfzijl perimeter, the next
forty-eight hours were similar for all of them.
Enemy shelling continued while plans were
prepared for further attacks. In Appingedam, the
British Columbia Dragoons were shelled so
heavily that one squadron had to move its
headquarters into an air-raid shelter, and
communication lines were cut faster than they
could be repaired. 18 To the north, the shelling
was broken for small periods by the few air
support missions that were flown during the
Delfzijl battle. The afternoon of April 25 saw an
attack by fighter-bombers on targets north of
Delfzijl, although they arrived before smoke
could be fired to mark targets, and "the bombing
was ineffective." 19 Twenty Spitfires and Typhoons
returned the next day, but heavy clouds and
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A Sherman Firejly. modified with extra armour. Q{ the 5th Canadian Armoured
Division. moves through the town of Put/en. Holland. 18 April 1945.

drizzle then set in across the region, becoming a
constant feature for the rest of the fighting. ~ 0 At
the same time. troops were happy to welcome
the 109th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment. Royal
Artillery, to the area south-west of Appingedam,
in an attempt to match the enemy's superior
guns. They were soon joined by one battery from
1st Heavy Regiment, R.A. 21
The period April 26-27 saw fighting resume
for all units in the Delfzijl pocket. The first to
advance were the Irish to the south, who moved
out of Wagenborgen in mid-afternoon on the
26th, facing little direct opposition but heavy
artillery fire. "C" Company passed through the
lead company, "A", at about 4:30. and continued
along the road to Heveskes until 6:00p.m. "D"
Company then moved off on the left, struggling
forward against strong opposition until 11:00
p.m., when all three companies dug in. 22
To the north, the Perth Regiment's attack
began shortly after. "D" Company led off at 12:35
a.m., followed closely by "C". and both were near
the coast of the Ems Estuary by 4:00 a.m. "D"
Company then began to face increasing small
arms fire. 8th Hussars tanks arrived to help,
and together they reached their objective. Strong
resistance continued, and one tank was knocked
out. The company commander made two

requests for additional armour over the next two
hours, before the enemy finally surrendered the
position, along with forty-two prisoners. The
tanks continued to be exposed to heavy artillery
fire for some time thereafter. 2 :1
While the Perths were advancing in the north,
a Westminster attack was getting underway at
the other end of the perimeter. Covered by
massed guns of supporting tanks, 17th Field
Regiment, and six new 105-mm Hussars tanks
dug in as artillery, "A" Company passed right
through Woldendorp before their opponents
recovered. They were promptly cut off, and
trapped for the rest of the day. Thai evening. a
counter-attack came in from all sides, and the
company only survived the hour-long battle
thanks to supporting fire from their own artillery
and tanks, and captured German arms that they
pressed into service. "C" Company launched an
attack on Woldendorp two hours later. taking
the rest of the night to reach their comrades.
Together, the survivors resisted another counterattack. and the two companies began to clear
the town. They were heavily shelled, but managed
to complete their task by noon. 24
As the Westminsters attempted to free their
men in Woldendorp on the night of April27 /28,
on the left two companies of the Irish began
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Canadian armour. including a Sherman "Flail'' tank, receives a warm
welcome as it passes through the streets of Putten. Holland, 18 April 1945.

another advance. "C" Company forced its way
through wire and considerable opposition
throughout the night, first light finding them 500
yards short of Heveskes. Meanwhile, "A"
Company moved off to the north-east, following
a canal that ended at Termunterzijl on the coast.
As they approached their objectives, small arms
fire increased, and the company was suddenly
surrounded. Only one platoon escaped the trap
that had been laid, and the rest ofthe company
found itself in the same position as that of the
Westminsters the day before. 25
To the north, the same night saw the Perths
launch a complicated four-company assault on
Nansum. "C" Company moved off at about 1:00
a.m., heading towards the heavy guns that had
shelled them for days. Unfortunately, the men
were trapped in a minefield about two hours
later, the Company Commander and Lieutenant
killed by the first mines. Patrols could not find a
gap before daybreak, and the whole Nansum
attack was delayed. All companies were heavily
shelled during the morning by enemy guns,
which were now firing at almost point-blank
range. ''D" Company finally managed to move
again at 3:15 that afternoon. Meeting slight
opposition, they called down their own artillery,
and ruthlessly set fire to houses to drive out
German defenders and maintain their advance.

They were finally halted by German artillery and
a self-propelled gun at about 4:30. Smoke was
fired over the positions, and one platoon
struggled onto the company's objectives. The
battalion's leading platoon drew up just short of
the Nansum guns at 7:15p.m., and the reserve
company was ordered to pass through. At 10:00
p.m. they, too, called for smoke, and twenty-five
minutes later they requested artillery fire to
neutralize the guns. "C" Company finally took
the fortified position at about 10:45 on the
evening of April 28, capturing 117 prisoners in
the process. 26
The capture of Nansum was completed
overnight. "A" Company led the advance, but had
a difficult time crossing the last 300-400 yards
in front of the town. They were stopped by a
machine gun at about 1:45 a.m., and remained
200 yards short of Nansum four hours later,
when they called for more ammunition. A
counter-attack followed shortly after. Although
they were never cut off, the men of"A" Company
were forced to rely on captured weapons and
ammunition to hold their position, just as the
Westminsters thirty-three hours earlier.
Supporting artillery fire helped to end the fight,
and the company's ammunition lines were reopened. It was not until 2:30p.m. that the last
of the day's obstacles were overcome and the
41
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~~~ die Verteidiger vom
Thirty thousand leqfiets Wee this one werefired
into the Delfz!jl pocket in specially modified
smoke shells on 29 April. The translation reads:

Kessel Delfziil

To the defenders of the Delfzijl Pocket.

Himmler

hat

heute

den Allierten

bedin

gungslose Kapitulation angeboten um weiteres
unniitzes blutvergieszen zu vermeiden.
Wir Kanadier nehmen an, dasz lhr bis jetzt
noch keine Ahnung davon habt.

Der Krieg ist praktisch aus.

Himmler has today offered unconditional
surrender to the Allies to prevent further
unnecessary bloodshed.
We Canadians assume that up to
now you don't know about this.
The War is practically over.
You have done your duty.
Send a representative over with a white
flag as a sign of your surrender.

lhre Pflicht ist getan.
The appeal was apparently unsuccessful.

Schickt einen Parlementar mit der

[From the War Diary. 5th Canadian Armoured
Division HQ. May 1945. App. 1 I 1A.]

weissen Flagge heri.iber zum
Zeichen der Uebergabe.
advance on Nansum resumed. Artillery fire was
directed on the village. and "A'' Company finally
entered it at 4:50p.m. Patrols continued to meet
opposition for the next hour. Meanwhile, "C" and
"D" companies spent the day clearing the
recently-captured coastal guns and the area
between Holwierde and Nansum. In all, the
Regiment took 295 prisoners for the day, and
its men were ready for a well-deserved rest when
the Cape Breton Highlanders relieved them that
evening, in preparation for the final attack on
Delfzijl. "D" Company stayed in action for the
time being, taking over "B" Company positions
in HolwierdeY
That night, the British Columbia Dragoons
launched their most complicated and potentially
dangerous operation of the battle, a combined
infantry-armoured attack to link up with the
Perths. All available tanks were enlisted to
support the assaulting troopers, and
Reconnaissance and even Headquarters tanks
were pressed into action to fill out the order of
battle. The force headed off at 10:15 p.m.,
moving north and then turning to come in on
the town ofMarsum from the west, "after liberally

shooting it up. "28 Despite their preparations the
Dragoons were quite happy to find the town
abandoned, although it was heavily shelled as
soon as they entered it. One troop of tanks was
sent towards Holwierde to contact the Perths,
closing the ring in the northern half of the
pocket. 29
To the south the Delfzijl perimeter was
closing as well. The Westminsters launched an
attack towards the coast before midnight, and
"B" Company found itself 1000 yards short of
Termunterzijl by first light. They chose to risk
running across the final stretch of open polder
rather than staying in their exposed positions.
By 5:15a.m. the company was firmly in town
and patrolling towards the water, having closed
a major evacuation centre. and trapping about
500 German prisoners. To the right. "A"
Company took control of the town ofTermunten
a short time later, and began patrolling east to
the Reider Spit, the battalion's last objective.
That afternoon "C" Company moved to within
sight of German crews loading and firing the guns
that tormented the Westminsters. The position
was well-defended by mines. wire. and concrete.
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however, and the only friendly artillery were six
105-mm Hussars tanks, and one 7.2-inch
howitzer from 1st Heavy Regiment, R.A. The men
were ordered to pull back to less exposed
positions while a two-company daylight attack
with full artillery support was prepared. 30
By then, the Cape Breton Highlanders had
moved into position for the final attack on
Delfzijl. At this point it is worth remembering
that Brigadier Johnston had hoped to rest his
troops after reducing the perimeter of the pocket.
But most of the guns remained active, and the
Canadians were now in point-blank range. In the
end, it proved less costly to have the CBH push
on and end the battle as quickly as possible.
Their C.O., Lt-Col R.B. Somerville, prepared an
intricate plan for the advance on Delfzijl, which
was to take place in several deliberate stages.
"A" and "B" companies were to lead off and
capture points on the coastal dyke east and
slightly north of Uitwierde. "C" Company would
pass through and take the battery of coastal guns
north of Delfzijl. "D" would then continue the
advance and seize a group of guns in the harbour,
to be followed by an attack on the railway station
at the northern edge of the port. From there,
troops would clear the town itself. 31 The attack
was planned to begin the night of April 29/30,
but Somerville was forced to change plans when
poor weather washed out roads in the rear.:32 A
further shock came in the form of one man killed
and two wounded as "A" Company came up to
relieve the Perths, when a German prisoner being
escorted to the rear accidentally stepped on a
mine. To top off a miserable night for "A"
Company, the weather was cold and wet, rations
did not get through due to a bogged tank blocking
the road, and the men were shelled during the
night. The opposition met by the Perths in
Nansum, and the need to clear the minefield they
had discovered, also influenced the Cape Breton
CO's decision to substitute an intermediate
attack on Uitwierde, which began just before
midnight. "A'" and "B" companies reached their
objectives within about three hours, meeting
moderate opposition and taking 240 prisoners
along the way.Tl
The CBH launched their final attack on the
port ofDelfzijl at 10:00 p.m. on the night of April
30.:14 "C" Company soon ran into a minefield,
and the pioneer section went to work. The
infantry broke free before 11:00 p.m., only to

meet more active resistance. Forty-nine prisoners
were taken following a short fight, and by
midnight the men were moving ahead again. By
morning, "D" Company got within 100 yards of
the Delfzijl guns that were the target of their
advance, before being pinned down short of
ammunition. As daylight approached, enemy
defences were clearly stronger than expected.
The New Brunswick Hussars lost two tanks
helping "B" Company forward, but went on
without them to capture one of the company's
objectives, a rare example of armour leading
infantry onto an objective, and proof of the degree
of cooperation achieved by units of 5th Division
by the end of the war.
By this point, "D" Company was urgently in
need of help. They were still pinned down, and
unable to send anyone back to guide in their
ammunition. A reinforcement platoon finally
reached them under cover of smoke, gathering
up a stray supply party along the way. Now that
"D" Company's position was secured, "B" was
ordered to move on to the Delfzijl railway station,
and another troop of Hussars tanks was sent to
help. They reached the station at 10:14 a.m.,
and captured several hundred prisoners during
and after their attack. It was during this advance
that the third Military Cross of the operation was
won. 35 Major Tim Ellis, who was temporarily
commanding "A" Squadron, describes the action
that won the M.C. for one of his Lieutenants:
I sent Bill Gerrard's troop in. only to have it shot
to a standstill part way there. Bill stood in his
turret while the Jerries were finishing off his
disabled tank and gave a detailed description of
the fortifications and gun positions. camouflaged
to look like houses, then made it safely back up
the ditch along with his crews. :lG

Gerrard's own gunner reportedly knocked out
two of the three anti- tank guns that opposed
the troop, before the crew finally evacuated the
tank. 37 Another of the crew members, who helped
the wounded men into the ditch, remembers that
German machine-gunners stopped firing for a
moment to allow them to get to safety.:;e
By 11:20 a.m., Delfzijl had been split in two
by the combined CBH-Sth Hussars attack. The
remaining defenders began heading to sea in
boats, but not before the Cape Breton
Highlanders brought their prisoner count for the
past three days to over 1500. To the south,
43
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German gunners also evacuated the Reider Spit
overnight, the Westminsters hearing the guns go
silent at 3:00 a.m. A freed Russian prisoner
arrived to report that the crew had left the Spit,
and a patrol went in to confirm the statement
that afternoon, after smoke cleared from around
the guns and a white flag became visible. Except
for some shelling from Emden, a minor nuisance
compared to the Spit guns, the rest of the
Westminsters' day was quiet.3 9
One final pocket of German troops remained,
located between Delfzijl and Farmsum. The task
of eliminating it fell to the Irish Regiment. "A"
Company set off from Heveskes one minute after
midnight on May 2, following a supporting
artillery barrage into Weiwerd. The company
raced through, seizing bridges on the western
outskirts of the town before they could be
destroyed. "C" Company soon arrived to help
clear Weiwerd, and despite strong opposition
they completed the task by about 3:00a.m. "B"
company in reserve moved up and passed
through Weiwerd two hours later. Supported
closely by Hussars tanks, the men moved down
the road toward Farmsum. The advance brought
on an immediate fire fight, and opposition
continued until 6:40 a.m., when the senior
German leader in the pocket finally requested
terms of surrender. Lt-Col L.H.C. Payne of the
Irish Regiment officially accepted the
unconditional surrender of the Delfzijl garrison
a few minutes later. 40
After the surrender of the last German
defenders, the Irish, British Columbia Dragoons
and Cape Breton Highlanders continued to clear
the area between Appingedam and Delfzijl,
establishing contact shortly after noon. 41 Helped
by the German commander, German and
Canadian engineers began clearing Delfzijl's port
area of mines. The Canadians reportedly tore
out demolition charges without even stopping
to search for booby-traps. 42 Over the next two
days. the pocket was fully cleared and units
either pulled back to rest areas or settled down
to coast-watching duties on the Ems Estuary. The
long-awaited news of the German surrender in
North-West Europe came on the evening of May
4, and for 5th Division the war formally ended
the next morning.

espite the late date of the Delfzijl battle. and
the speed with which peace followed, the
operation was carried out with dash and
efficiency. Sixty-two men sacrificed their lives to
seize the port, against formidable opposition. In
hindsight, the usefulness of the fighting might
be questioned. As has been argued, however, at
the time of the attack it was made for what
seemed to be valid reasons. Commanders hoped
to use Delfzijl to land relief supplies, and it was
an important defensive link to Emden, a strategic
target where 3rd Division was still operating.
Once units were in place around the pocket.
enemy artillery combined with orders limiting
the use of supporting weapons led Brigadier
Johnston to begin his attack immediately, to
reduce his frontage and the dangers to his troops.
As the fighting continued it became evident that
his position would not improve until the pocket
was completely eliminated. and so the battle
continued. It is only after the fact that we know
just how near the war was to ending. Years later,
Brigadier Johnston made a comment that
probably best summarizes the sacrifice of the
sixty-two men of 5th Division who gave their lives
in late April and early May of 1945: "'They were
determined in the capture ofDelfzijl when victory
was in our hands and life once more was
precious. "4 :3
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